At dawn on 21 January, it was attacked by a roughly 300-strong PAVN battalion. During aerial resupply:1 KC-130, 3 C-123 ARVN losses: 229 killed, 436 wounded (not including CIDG, RF/PF and SOG losses)CIDG losses: 1,000 1,500 killed or missing, at least 250 captured (in Lang Vei), wounded unknown[16] Kingdom of Laos: Unknown. McNamara wrote: "because of terrain and other conditions peculiar to our operations in South Vietnam, it is inconceivable that the use of nuclear weapons would be recommended there against either Viet Cong or North Vietnamese forces". That proved to be the last overland attempt at resupply for Khe Sanh until the following March. The legendary siege at Khe Sanh occurred in 1968, but during the spring of 1967, the United States Marines fought in northwestern Quang Tri Province in what became the first stage of the Khe Sanh battles. [115] This equates to roughly 1,300 tons of bombs dropped daily 5 tons for every one of the 20,000 PAVN soldiers initially estimated to have been committed to the fighting at Khe Sanh. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group, microwave/tropospheric scatter technology, "The Battle of Khe Sanh 40th Anniversary: Casualties in May 1968", "The Battle of Khe Sanh 40th Anniversary: Casualties in June 1968", https://web.archive.org/web/20080215233328/http://www.historynet.com/wars_conflicts/vietnam_war/3029941.html?featured=y&c=y, https://www.historynet.com/recounting-the-casualties-at-the-deadly-battle-of-khe-sanh/, https://www.historynet.com/the-withdrawal-from-khe-sanh/?f, "Khe Sanh: 6,000 Marines Dug In for Battle", "The US's secret plan to nuke Vietnam, Laos", "Memorandum for the President, 19 February 1968", "Battlefields of Khe Sanh: Still One Casualty a Day", "The US Army Quartermaster Air Delivery Units and the Defense of Khe Sanh", "5 things you didn't know about Khe Sanh", "Operational Report Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 8th Battalion 4th Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1971", "Narrative of Events of Company B, 2nd Battalion, 506th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) During LAM SON 719", United States Army Center of Military History, Bibliography: The Tet Offensive and the Battle of Khe Sanh, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Battle_of_Khe_Sanh&oldid=1142289112. Declassified documents show that in response, Westmoreland considered using nuclear weapons. Operation Pegasus: ~20,000 (1st Air Cavalry and Marine units), U.S. losses:At Khe Sanh: 274 killed2,541 wounded (not including ARVN Ranger, RF/PF, Forward Operation Base 3 US Army and Royal Laotian Army losses)[15]Operation Scotland I and Operation Pegasus: 730 killed2,642 wounded,7 missing[15]Operation Scotland II (15 April 1968 July 1968):485 killed2,396 wounded[1]USAF:5 ~ 20 killed, wounded unknown[1]Operation Charlie for the final evacuation:At least 11 marines killed, wounded unknown[1] No logic was apparent to them behind the sustained PAVN/VC offensives other than to inflict casualties on the allied forces. The fighting was heavy. 6,000 men North Vietnamese Vo Nguyen Giap Tran Quy Hai Approx. Ten American soldiers were killed; the rest managed to escape down Route 9 to Khe Sanh. [66] Hours after the bombardment ceased, the base was still in danger. The attack was to have been supported by armor and artillery. [23][Note 2], James Marino wrote that in 1964, General William Westmoreland, the US commander in Vietnam, had determined, "Khe Sanh could serve as a patrol base blocking enemy infiltration from Laos; a base for operations to harass the enemy in Laos; an airstrip for reconnaissance to survey the Ho Chi Minh Trail; a western anchor for the defenses south of the DMZ; and an eventual jumping-off point for ground operations to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Upon closer analysis, the official figure does not accurately portray even what it purports to represent. The base was officially closed on July 5. One headquarters would allocate and coordinate all air assets, distributing them wherever they were considered most necessary, and then transferring them as the situation required. [15], Unknown (1,602 bodies were counted, US official public estimated 10,00015,000 KIA,[19][20] but MACV's secret report estimated 5,550 killed as of 31 March 1968)[1]. [54] In attempting to determine PAVN intentions Marine intelligence confirmed that, within a period of just over a week, the 325th Division had moved into the vicinity of the base and two more divisions were within supporting distance. Ray Stubbe has published a translation of the North Vietnamese history of the siege at Khe Sanh. Battlefield boundaries extended from eastern Laos eastward along both sides of Route 9 in Quang Tri province, Vietnam, to the coast. [119] By 11:00, the battle was over, Company A had lost 24 dead and 27 wounded, while 150 PAVN bodies were found around the position, which was then abandoned. On 8 February 1971, the leading ARVN units marched along Route 9 into southern Laos while the US ground forces and advisers were prohibited from entering Laos. None of the deaths associated with Scotland II are included in the official count. The aircrew then had to contend with antiaircraft fire on the way out. In his memoirs, he listed the reasons for a continued effort: Khe Sanh could serve as a patrol base for blocking enemy infiltration from Laos along Route 9; as a base for SOG operations to harass the enemy in Laos; as an airstrip for reconnaissance planes surveying the Ho Chi Minh Trail; as the western anchor for defenses south of the DMZ; and as an eventual jump-off point for ground operations to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Gordan L Rottman, Osprey Campaign 150: The Khe Sanh 1967-68, p. 51. The NVA used Hill 881 North to launch 122mm rockets at the Marines during the siege. This is also the position taken in the official PAVN history but offers no further explanation of the strategy. The Marines at Khe Sanh Combat Base broke out of their perimeter and began attacking the North Vietnamese in the surrounding area. [67], At the same time as the artillery bombardment at KSCB, an attack was launched against Khe Sanh village, seat of Hng Ha District. The report continues to state, "this prompted Air Force chief of staff, General John McConnell, to press, although unsuccessfully, for JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) authority to request Pacific Command to prepare a plan for using low-yield nuclear weapons to prevent a catastrophic loss of the U.S. Marine base. The attacks hindered the advancement of the McNamara Line, and as the fighting around Khe Sanh intensified, vital equipment including sensors and other hardware had to be diverted from elsewhere to meet the needs of the US garrison at Khe Sanh. Strategically, however, the withdrawal meant little. However, even if Westmoreland believed his statement, his argument never moved on to the next logical level. The official figure of 205 KIA only represents Marine deaths in the Operation Scotland TAORthat is, Marines killed in proximity to the Khe Sanh Combat Base during the period from November 1, 1967, to March 31, 1968. Things heated up for the air cavalrymen on 6 April, when the 3rd Brigade encountered a PAVN blocking force and fought a day-long engagement. "[24] In November 1964, the Special Forces moved their camp to the Xom Cham Plateau, the future site of Khe Sanh Combat Base. By the end of January 1968, he had moved half of all US combat troops, nearly 50 maneuver battalions, to I Corps. [82], By the end of the battle, USAF assets had flown 9,691 tactical sorties and dropped 14,223tons of bombs on targets within the Khe Sanh area. [110], As more infantry units had been assigned to defend KSCB, artillery reinforcement kept pace. Of the 4953 Navy and Air Force casualties, both officer and enlisted, 4, 736 or 96% were white. The North Vietnamese lost as many as 15,000 casualties during the siege of Khe Sanh. The opportunity to engage and destroy a formerly elusive enemy that was moving toward a fixed position promised a victory of unprecedented proportions. The Tet Offensive was about to begin. [32], Westmoreland responded by launching Operation Neutralize, an aerial and naval bombardment campaign designed to break the siege. The strike wounded two more Strike Force soldiers and damaged two bunkers. They too were left out of the official Khe Sanh casualty count. 20,000-30,000 men Battle of Khe Sanh Overview Besieged, Khe Sanh could only be resupplied by air. The most controversial statistic in Vietnam was the number of killed in action (KIA) claimed by each side. On April 20, Operation Prairie IV began, with heavy fighting between the Marines and NVA forces. "[105] There had been a history of distrust between the Special Forces personnel and the Marines, and General Rathvon M. Tompkins, commander of the 3rd Marine Division, described the Special Forces soldiers as "hopped up wretches [who] were a law unto themselves. Because of washed-out bridges and heavy enemy activity, however, the only way for Americans to get to Khe Sanh was by helicopter or airplane. [59], Making matters worse for the defenders, any aircraft that braved the weather and attempted to land was subject to PAVN antiaircraft fire on its way in for a landing. Battle of la Drang Valley (26 October - 27 . On January 21 at Khe Sanh, 30,000 North Vietnamese troops attacked an air base held by just 6,000 United States Marines. Battle of Khe Sanh : American Casualties We have 535 casualty profiles listed in our archive. In the course of the fighting, Allied forces fired 151,000 artillery rounds, flew 2,096 tactical air sorties, and conducted 257 B-52 Stratofortress strikes. The lossesindicating that the enemy suffered a major defeatwere estimated at 3,550 KIA inflicted by delivered fires (i.e., aerial and artillery bombardment) and 2,000 KIA from ground action, for a total of 5,550 estimated North Vietnamese killed in action as of March 31. Only nine US battalions were available from Hue/Phu Bai northward. GitHub export from English Wikipedia. On January 14, Marines from Company B, 3rd Recon Battalion, were moving up the north slope of Hill 881 North, a few miles northwest of Khe Sanh Combat Base. The most comprehensive and authoritative history site on the Internet. In the aftermath, the North Vietnamese proclaimed a victory at Khe Sanh, while US forces claimed that they had withdrawn, as the base was no longer required. Whether the destruction of one battalion could have been the goal of two to four PAVN divisions was debatable. Cushman, the new III MAF commander, supported Westmoreland perhaps because he wanted to mend Army/Marine relations after the departure of Walt. The withdrawal of the last Marines under the cover of darkness was hampered by the shelling of a bridge along Route 9, which had to be repaired before the withdrawal could be completed. Siege at Khe Sanh: ~17,200 (304th and 308th Division), Defense at Route 9: ~16,900 (320th and 324th Division), This page was last edited on 1 March 2023, at 15:52. [118], On the night of the fall of Lang Vei, three companies of the PAVN 101D Regiment moved into jump-off positions to attack Alpha-1, an outpost west of the Combat Base held by 66 men of Company A, 1st Platoon, 1/9 Marines. ~45,000 in total[11]~6,000 Marines at the Combat Base of Khe Sanh[12] [153][154] The gradual withdrawal of US forces began during 1969 and the adoption of Vietnamization meant that, by 1969, "although limited tactical offensives abounded, US military participation in the war would soon be relegated to a defensive stance. Casualties were heavy among the attacking PAVN, who lost over 200 killed, while the defending Marines lost two men. [69] Due to the arrival of the 304th Division, KSCB was further reinforced by the 1st Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment on 22 January. [75], Niagara I was completed during the third week of January, and the next phase, Niagara II, was launched on the 21st,[76] the day of the first PAVN artillery barrage. Marines remained around Hill 689, though, and fighting in the vicinity continued until 11 July until they were finally withdrawn, bringing the battle to a close. American logistical, aerial, and artillery support was provided to the operation. [58] These tactics were reminiscent of those employed against the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, particularly in relation to entrenching tactics and artillery placement, and the realization assisted US planners in their targeting decisions. [157], Commencing in 1966, the US had attempted to establish a barrier system across the DMZ to prevent infiltration by North Vietnamese troops. This base was to serve as the western anchor of Marine Corps forces, which had tactical responsibility for the five northernmost provinces of South Vietnam known as I Corps. MACV therefore initiated an operation to open Route 9 to vehicle traffic. Not including ARVN Ranger, RF/PF, Forward Operation Base 3 U.S. Army, Royal Laotian Army and SOG commandos losses. [10] Once the news of the closure of KSCB was announced, the American media immediately raised questions about the reasoning behind its abandonment. [71][72], Nine days before the Tet Offensive broke out, the PAVN opened the battle of Khe Sanh and attacked the US forces just south of the DMZ. Hernandez was killed. [117], Cumulative friendly casualties for Operation Scotland, which began on 1 November 1967, were: 205 killed in action, 1,668 wounded, and 25 missing and presumed dead. [105] At 07:40, a relief force from Company A, 2nd Platoon set out from the main base and attacked through the PAVN, pushing them into supporting tank and artillery fire. [93], The situation changed radically during the early morning hours of 7 February. [152] The Marines occupied Hill 950 overlooking the Khe Sanh plateau from 1966 until September 1969 when control was handed to the Army who used the position as a SOG operations and support base until it was overrun by the PAVN in June 1971. [83] Westmoreland later wrote, "Washington so feared that some word of it might reach the press that I was told to desist, ironically answering what those consequences could be: a political disaster. The Battle of Khe Sanh took place between January 21 and July 9, 1968; however, most of the official statistics provided pertain only to Operation Scotland, which ended on March 31, or to the 77-day period beginning what is classified as the Siege of Khe Sanh, where the 26th Marines were pinned down until Operations Niagara, and Pegasus freed Westmoreland planned on Khe Sanh being relieved and then used as the jump-off point for a "hot pursuit" of enemy forces into Laos. The Marine defense of Khe Sanh, Operation Scotland, officially ended on March 31. That action prematurely triggered a PAVN offensive aimed at taking Khe Sanh. [43] Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman Jr. relieved Walt as commander of III MAF in June. For most of the battle, low-lying clouds and fog enclosed the area from early morning until around noon, and poor visibility severely hampered aerial resupply. At 0330 hours, soldiers of the NVA 6th Battalion, 2nd Regiment, 325C Division, attacked the Marines on Hill 861. Khe Sanh was situated on Route 9, the major east-west highway. [58] The USAF delivered 14,356 tons of supplies to Khe Sanh by air (8,120 tons by paradrop). After a ten-day battle, the attackers were pushed back into Cambodia. From the Hu site the communication signal was sent to Danang headquarters where it could be sent anywhere in the world. Westmoreland had been forwarding operational plans for an invasion of Laos since 1966. The fighting around Khe Sanh began January 21, 1968, and concluded around April 8, 1968. The United States Marines gave the actual body count of the NVA troops killed to be 1,602, but estimates show that the total number of NVA troops . Westmoreland echoed this judgment in his memoirs, and, using exactly the same figures, concluded that the North Vietnamese had suffered a most damaging and one-sided defeat. The battalion was assaulted on the night of 23 January by three PAVN battalions supported by seven tanks. The US command in Saigon initially believed that combat operations around KSCB during 1967 were part of a series of minor PAVN offensives in the border regions. Few areas of the world have been as hotly contested as the India-Pakistan border. The PAVN, however, were not through with the ARVN troops. [80] Westmoreland insisted for several months that the entire Tet Offensive was a diversion, including, famously, attacks on downtown Saigon and obsessively affirming that the true objective of the North Vietnamese was Khe Sanh.
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